ABSTRACT. Problems for strict and convex Bayesianism are discussed. A set-based Bayesianism generalizing convex Bayesianism and intervalism is proposed. This approach abandons not only the strict Bayesian requirement of a unique real-valued probability function in any decision-making context but also the requirement of convexity for a set-based representation of uncertainty. Levi's E-admissibility decision criterion is retained and is shown to be applicable in the non-convex case.
Introduction.
The reigning philosophy of uncertainty representation is strict Bayesianism. One of its central principles is that an agent must adopt a single, real-valued probability function over the events recognized as relevant to a given problem.
Prescriptions for defining such a function for a given agent in a given situation range from the extreme personalism of deFinetti (1964, 1974) and Savage (1972) to the objective Bayesianism of Jeffreys (1939) and Jaynes (1968) . The latter, in the form of Jaynes' maximum entropy principle (1982) , is in favor among researchers in artificial intelligence (Cheeseman, 1983) . The appeal to computer scientists of maximum entropy methods is partly explained by the relative ease with which they permit the computation of unambiguous solutions to inference and decision problems faced by artificial and interactive systems.
Criticism of the restriction of an agent to a single probability function dates back at least to Keynes (1921) . More recently, Levi (1974 Levi ( , 1980 and Kyburg (1961 Kyburg ( , 1983 have developed alternatives to strict Bayesianism that have been dubbed convex Bayesianism and intervalism, respectively. Levi's convex Bayesianism allows an agent a set of probability functions, but the set must be convex. He has developed a decision method that reduces to strict Bayesian maximization of expected utility relative to a single probability function when the set of functions has only one member. Kyburg's approach retains a single probability function, but allows the function to be interval-valued: the probability of an event is not a single number, but an interval of numbers. Mathematically, the proposals are similar. Seidenfeld (1983) has argued that for purposes of decision-making, the interval-valued function should be replaced with the (convex) set of real-valued functions bounded by the intervals; Levi's methods may then be applied to this set.
The leading alternative to strict Bayesianism among practitioners is Dempster-Shafer Theory, in which non-additive belief functions replace classical probability functions (Shafer, 1975) . Kyburg (1987) has shown that, although this theory is a generalization of strict Bayesianism, it is a special case of convex Bayesianism. For any belief function there exists a convex set of classical probability functions defined on its frame of discernment from which it can be recovered. However, there exist (perfectly meaningful and reasonable) convex sets of classical probability functions to which there do not correspond belief functions.
We propose to extend convex Bayesianism and intervalism to a more general set-based Bayesianism. Set-based Bayesianism would drop not only the strict Bayesian requirement of a unique real-valued probability function but also the requirement of convexity for a set of functions. The approach would be Bayesian by (among other things) retaining the requirement that a decision method for sets of probability functions reduce, for unit sets, to maximization of expected utility.
Problems for Strict Bayesianism.
We use the term strict Bayesianism following Levi (1985) . According to the strict Bayesian view, "a rational agent is committed to recognizing a single probability function for use in computing expected utilities in any given context of deliberation," and is compelled to select a course of action that has maximum expected utility, relative to that probability function, among the alternatives under consideration.
There are many types of information bearing on an algebra of events relative to which a strict Bayesian would be hard-pressed to come up with a classical, numerically determinate probability function. A number of these situations are discussed in the following sections. In some of the examples, further reflection (or badgering) to reduce the indeterminacy seems to be an implausible solution. In others there is no further information that could be (or could have been) obtained that would help the agent arrive at a single probability function. The method of maximum entropy, by which the indeterminacy is resolved algorithmically (and hence "objectively") is also discussed and criticized.
Frequencies.
Many of the probabilities that we set the greatest store by, and that we regard as the most reliable bases for decision in the face of uncertainty, are probabilities that are based on statistical knowledge. Thus we think we know that ordinary coins land heads nearly half the time, that the dice in well regulated casinos land with double-one about 1/36th of the time, that the frequency of males among newborn humans is very close to 0.515, and so on, and when possible we would like to base the probabilities that we use for making decisions on such statistical knowledge. Despite the worry that we often "have no statistics," relevant statistical data can often be found. The probability of 'heads' on the one and only toss of a newly minted coin that is then to be destroyed can perfectly well be based on the masses of statistics we are assumed to have concerning coin tosses in general.
Standard statistical methods yield confidence intervals, or lead to the rejection of all but a set of hypotheses, as the examples cited indicate. There are two difficulties for the strict Bayesian. First, the strict Bayesian cannot tolerate an interval: he needs a real number in order to be strict. Second, classical statistical methods are themselves not acceptable for the strict Bayesian.
The strict Bayesian cannot identify a probability with an interval; he is committed to choosing some point − presumably a point in that interval − to represent his degree of belief.
But there seems no non-arbitrary way to choose a point. The midpoint makes sense only if the distribution of belief in the interval is symmetric. Furthermore, from a Bayesian perspective, even if the midpoint were the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameter in question, the probability that the parameter had that value would be zero.
The Bayesian statistician does not have the problem of choosing a point in that interval, because he rejects classical methods. He insists that all inference be done through Bayes' theorem, and that one must always have a prior distribution, implicitly if not explicitly, in order to perform inference.
This means that the correct characterization of my belief about ordinary coins is that the proportion of heads that they yield can be anywhere from 0 to 1, with a sharp high peak of belief in the neighborhood of a half. In order to make a decision based on my beliefs about coins and their flips, I must integrate to find the probability of heads: 1 pΦ(p)dp Prob (Heads) = ∫ 0 It is true that the value of this integral is a half, or close to it, but it is not clear that we must start with a prior distribution of heads on tosses of coins in advance of any evidence. It is, at any rate, not clear that classical statistical methods should be rejected out of hand, together with the confidence intervals and families of unrejected hypotheses that accompany them.
Qualitative comparative probability
A statement of qualitative comparative probability, for example, "A is more probable than B", may be the strongest statement that a person is willing to make. One might press such a person for a single number for the probability of A by iteratively quizzing him on preference/indifference between a lottery with prize X and probability p (A) of winning and a lottery with prize X and some stated probability of winning (initially, say, 3/4, if 'B' is 'not-
A,' corresponding to the statement "A is more likely than not"), until convergence to p (A) is achieved with sufficient precision. Of course, an individual may, as part of the introspective process of assessing his subjective probabilities, apply the procedure to himself.
Such a procedure, whether it is applied introspectively or by a bullying psychologist, may not be successful. The person may express indifference between a lottery with prize X and probability p (A) of winning, and any number of lotteries with prize X and stated probabilities of winning between 0.6 and 0.9. When it comes to buying and selling lotteries, of course he will be consistent. But we have little reason to take very seriously the real number he happens to settle on in one instance of the measurement procedure.
Since probabilities are assessed not for their own sake but to guide action, there may be little point in conducting many cycles of inquiry or introspection. There may only be limited evidence, yielding broad bounds on the probabilities, and yet this may suffice perfectly well for decision.
Example: A woman has taken her ill toddler to a country doctor and reported that the child has swallowed either substance V or substance R, but that "it is more likely" that R was swallowed. (The child was left unattended near open bottles of both; after drinking any of one, the child would not drink any of the other; both bottles are on their sides; both liquids are odorless, but R is red and V is colorless; the mother is aware of studies indicating that children prefer colorful things and has no reason to believe that her child is an exception.)
There are no signs (e.g., dilated pupils) that would distinguish between the two substances that can be detected without equipment unavailable to the doctor. Ipecac is the suggested treatment for ingestion of V; rest is recommended for R-poisoning.
The doctor has two alternatives. First he may attempt to determine the exact probability that the child has swallowed R by relentlessly quizzing the mother: "Would you," he might demand, "prefer a lottery with a prize X and probability p (R), where p (R) is the probability that the child swallowed R, to a lottery with prize X and chance 3/4 of winning? No? Well, what about a lottery ..."
The other alternative is to ignore the exact magnitude of the mother's belief. (Why should this be relevant anyway?) Without further delay, the doctor is able to infer bounds on p (V) and p (R) of
Treatment with ipecac is strongly contraindicated in cases of R-poisoning. It is not necessary -----6 -to give ipecac in cases of V-poisoning, although it will make the child feel better much sooner. On this basis, the doctor constructs the utility matrix
The set of classical probability functions compatible with the bounds may be represented as a 2 line segment in the space [0, 1] with endpoints (0.5, 0.5) and (1, 0), where the first of the two dimensions represents p (R). The doctor is aware that expected utility is a linear function of the probabilities, e.g.,
and thus that the maximum and minimum values for the expected utility of either action, as p ranges over the line segment of possible values compatible with the qualitative information given by the mother, are achieved for one of the endpoints:
Thus, for any compatible classical probability function, rest will have the higher expected utility, and is prescribed by the doctor.
Representing the probabilities as a real-valued function, e.g., p (R)=0.75, p (V)=0.25, will give the same result; an advantage of the analysis using bounds is that the doctor can be sure (for his utility matrix) that prescribing rest is the better action for any p for which p (R)≥0.5.
More generally, a numerical, but not necessarily determinate, representation can be found for an arbitrary consistent system of qualitative probability judgements. Such a system is consistent if a real number can be associated with each proposition so that the classical probability axioms are satisfied and so that if x is associated with X and y is associated with Y and the statement 'X is at least as probable as Y' is in the system or is implied by it, then x≥y.
Suppose that the judgments "A is at least as probable as B" and "B or C is at least as probable as A" are made for mutually exclusive and exhaustive events A, B, and C. Any of the infinitely many solutions to the system of linear inequalities
for example,
is compatible with these judgments. If nothing stronger than these comparisons is forthcoming, then there is no basis for choosing a single one of these functions as representative of the probability information.
On the other hand, statements of noncomparative qualitative probability, e.g., "A is very probable", are notoriously vague. (The decision of the U.S. to invade Cuba in 1961 has been blamed in part on the misunderstanding of such a probability assessment (Zwick et al., 1990 ).) If a decision of any consequence must be made contingent on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of A, then an attempt should be made to narrow the range of possible numbers for p (A). But it is not necessary to determine a single number, as the example above illustrates.
Conditional probability assessments
One may be able to come up with real number values only for certain conditional probabilities. Each assessment p (E | E ) = x is a constraint on a classical probability function over i j events E in the form of a linear equation
on quantities p (w), where w is an elementary event. In general, there will be infinitely many probability functions consistent with a set of conditional probability assessments. 
since B, C, and D are elementary events. The pair of assessments thus translates into the system of simultaneous linear equations 
Marginal probabilities
Probabilities on a set of events of interest must sometimes be inferred from other probabilities. In certain cases, the axioms of probability allow unambiguous determination of the values in question, while in others they do not. 
Example:
The movements of a flatfish in a tank are being monitored by two children enrolled in a summer program for gifted elementary school students. Each of the three dimensions of the tank is bisected to produce eight regions. The tank is placed on a table and the students are seated so that they face different planes. Working together for two five-day weeks in two four-hour shifts per day, each student records the location of the fish within the plane (s)he is monitoring every twenty seconds, at the sound of a buzzer. Probabilities (based on 14,400 joint observations) are estimated as:
Each of these numbers is a constraint on a possible function p . For example, r (LL) = 0.1
XYZ XY
implies that
There are infinitely many classical probability functions p satisfying all eight of the XYZ (linear) equations
simultaneously. The first four equations are associated with the function r (and jointly Had a third student, at the risk of being detected by the fish and disrupting its natural pattern of movement, been suspended above the tank to record location in the YZ plane (parallel to the floor and ceiling), the resulting set of functions would have been a subset, but not necessarily a unit set; the function p might remain indeterminate. Suppose that the obser-
XYZ
vations of the third student resulted in the probability function
1 is compatible with r and r in the sense that the intersection of its extension to XYZ r XY XZ YZ with the extensions of r and r is nonempty; i.e., the system of equations resulting from
XY XZ
the addition of the equations
to the system of eight linear equations above has a solution. In fact, it has a unique solution:
However, another compatible probability function over YZ is
There are infinitely many solutions to the system of equations that it determines. Bounds on values of p may be deduced from this system as: 0.225, 0.275] Additional constraints on the events in the space XYZ could be imposed together with which the probability functions r and r determine a single numerically determinate pro-XY XZ bability function p . For example, under the assumption that location along the Z dimen-XYZ sion is conditionally independent of location along the Y dimension, given the location of the fish along the X dimension, in which case 
But what would be the basis for such an assumption? Of the two independence relations that can be tested against the data, one (X independent of Y) holds exactly but the other (X independent of Z) does not, even approximately:
Maximum entropy methods
Resolution of indeterminacy by selection of the maximum entropy element of the set of classical probability functions consistent with available information is widely practiced.
Justification given for this method ranges from the ease with which the maximum entropy element is computed in most cases to the arguments of E.T. Jaynes (1982) that this element is the most likely to arise and that it is the least "biased" (in a non-statistical sense) of these functions.
The last of these, the argument that the maximum entropy element of such a set embodies no more information than is minimally implied by the given constraints, is easily dispensed with. If information is quantified as negative entropy, then it is tautologous that adoption of the maximum entropy distribution is adoption of the distribution that is minimally informative among all those compatible with the given data. But the axioms leading to the
, to Shannon's entropy) for a measure of uncertainty defined for classical probability functions are controversial (Macqueen et al., 1975) . And, intuitively, ruling out any member of a set of probability functions compatible with given constraints seems to be going "beyond the information given". Information measures for sets of probability functions have been proposed (Dalkey, 1985; Jeffrey, 1983) . Any such measure will have the property that the information content of a set exceeds that of any of its supersets. Thus, a set of distributions will have lower information content than the singleton subset consisting of its maximum entropy element.
The impression that many users of maximum entropy methods have that the maximum entropy distribution is the "most likely to arise" is due to Jaynes' concentration theorem (1982) : Suppose that an experiment with a finite number n of possible outcomes (e.g., die toss) the relative frequencies of which are subject to given linear constraints, e.g., as implied by given expected values (E (X) = 3.5) or marginal probabilities (p (X is odd) = 1/2), is to be repeated N times. Suppose that experimental outcome i is observed f times. Then the number i of possible sequences of outcomes giving a frequency distribution f , . . . , f is given by the
The relative frequency distribution (p , . . . , p ) with the greatest number of possible 1 n sequences of outcomes giving rise to it is the distribution maximizing M (subject to the constraints). But maximizing M is equivalent to maximizing any monotonic increasing function
of M, e.g., the function N log M. But, from the Stirling approximation (log x !→xlog x, as
the entropy of p. So, the relative frequency distribution maximizing entropy is the distribution with the greatest number of sequences of experimental outcomes corresponding to it.
Further (and the proof of this (Jaynes, 1982) follows Pearson's derivation of the chi-squared distribution), as N→∞, the closer (as measured by difference in entropy) a relative frequency distribution compatible with the constraints is to the (unique) maximum entropy distribution in the set of compatible distributions, the more sequences of experimental outcomes there are that could generate it.
One may object that the theorem is applicable only in connection with the experimental situations described above. Even for such experiments, the result is only asymptotically valid. As Seidenfeld has objected, no indication is given of the rate at which this concentration occurs (1986).
There is also some circularity in taking the concentration theorem as providing "a quantitative justification for that intuitive predilection that we all feel for the uniform distribution" (Jaynes, 1982; p. 941 ) (since the maximum entropy distribution in the absence of constraints is the uniform distribution) when the (clearly intended) "higher probability" (vs. "higher multiplicity") construal of the concentration theorem follows from the assignment of equal probability to each of the possible sequences of experimental outcomes. The probability of N repetitions of an experiment generating a particular observed relative frequency distribution is the sum of the probabilities of each of the sequences of N experimental outcomes giving rise to it. Assigning equal positive probability to all sequences compatible with the constraints is merely a sufficient condition for the higher probability interpretation of the theorem, but there does not seem to be a simple alternative assignment of probability consistent with this interpretation. For all one knows, though, there may be factors making some sequences compatible with the stated constraints more likely than others.
Regarding the ease with which maximum entropy solutions are obtained, consider the geometry of a set of classical probability functions compatible with given constraints. Let W = {w , . . . , w } denote a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. The n probabili-1 n ties of these events determine those of each member of the Boolean algebra of events over W, the set of all subsets of W. Any probability function on W can be unambiguously represented
by its values p (w ), ...,p (w ). The vector of these values in turn may be represented as a point 1 n n in the space [0, 1] . The set of all such points is the (n −1)-dimensional simplex whose n vertices are the permutations of (1,0, ..., 0). For 2 elementary events, the simplex is a line segment; for 3 events, a triangle; for 4 events, a tetrahedron; etc. Constraints on probabilities will determine a subset of the full simplex. Those discussed so far will determine a convex polytope of compatible probability functions. In such cases an arbitrary vertex is probably easier to calculate than the maximum entropy element (which itself rarely will be a vertex).
What about the risk involved when the maximum entropy element is selected from a set of distributions one of which is regarded (pace deFinetti) as "correct, but unknown"?
Although we have not seen it expressed in print, the feeling is probably widespread that the maximum entropy element is a "safe bet" in the sense that the expected or maximum distance from it to any other member of the (sub)set of probability distributions compatible with given constraints is either the minimum possible or close to this minimum. For measures of distance between probability distributions that are convex and symmetric, this amounts to the impression that it is close to the centroid (average member) of the set. Except under special conditions determined by the form of the constraints given, the maximum entropy element is guaranteed to coincide with the centroid only when the set is a singleton or is the simplex of all possible distributions over the events under consideration (i.e., when there are no constraints beyond the probability axioms).
It is possible for the maximum entropy element of an infinite set of distributions to be an extreme point. Consider the case of a coin for which a confidence interval for p (H) of [0.1, 0.5] has been determined. This may be regarded as a constraint on classical probability functions over the set of elementary events {H, T}. The set of points (p (H), p (T)) corresponding to this set of functions is a line segment with endpoints (0.1, 0.9) and (0.5, 0.5).
The probability function with maximum entropy corresponds to the endpoint (0.5, 0.5). The function corresponding to the centroid (0.3, 0.7) would be the usual point estimate from such frequencies.
To explore in more detail the geometric properties of the maximum entropy element for a specific type of constraint, consider a 2x2 contingency table with given marginal probabilities x=p (A), 1−x =p (A), y=p (B) and 1−y =p (B):
These determine four linear constraints (one of which is always redundant) on the four joint probabilities p (AB),p (AB),p (AB) and p (AB):
The set S of solutions to these equations will be a convex polytope within the tetrahedron of all possible probability functions over the four joint events. Any feasible value for p (AB) will determine the other three joint probability values. Thus, the solution set has at most two vertices; it is either a single point or a line segment in four dimensions. Let l (AB) and u (AB) denote, respectively, the minimum and maximum feasible values for p (AB). Then
Indexing as (p (AB),p (AB),p (AB),p (AB)), the vertices v and v of S (which may coincide)
are:
The centroid of S is:
The (unique) maximum entropy joint distribution is calculated from the marginals under the assumption of probabilistic independence between A and B (Lewis, 1959) :
Define the eccentricity of an element p of S as
where c is the centroid and d is Euclidean distance. ecc (p, S) will have a minimum value of 0 (when p =c) and a maximum value of 1 (for a vertex of S).
For the marginal constraints given by the table For this example, ecc (m, S) = 0.8, which is somewhat high.
For 10,000,000 randomly generated pairs (p (A), p (B)), the average value of ecc (m, S) was found to be 0.333. The maximum value was 0.999. The expected value of ecc (p, S) for a randomly selected member p of a non-singleton S is 0.5. So, at least for this type of constraint, one cannot expect the maximum entropy element to be a particularly low-risk estimate.
Intervalism
A common motivation for Bayesians to abandon 'strictness' is discomfort with finding a rationale for providing the real numbers that the strict theory says must exist. We have looked at one procedure for obtaining these numbers − the maximum entropy procedure − and found ourselves compelled to side with the dissenters: the case has not been made and will be difficult to make.
In psychological terms, the difficulty may be seen as a difficulty of measurement. The reports of experts, the hypothetical choices of decision makers, may turn out to be inconsistent. But if we think of those reports and choices as containing an element of error, the inconsistency of the reports may be taken to suggest, not the falsity of the theory, but the accuracy of the introspections on the basis of which the reports and choices are made. This is, in fact, typical of the way in which our theories of error are developed in many domains, and so is a perfectly natural idea to adopt in connection with degrees of belief.
Nevertheless, it is surely reasonable to question the theory itself. If we were to measure light ray triangles on the surface of the earth, and discovered a systematic bias toward negative errors, it would be natural to suppose that the geometry of light rays near the surface of the earth was Riemannian rather than Euclidean. The situation is different with regard to degrees of belief, since there is (we may suppose) no systematic bias. On the other hand, with respect to free choice, among alternatives, there is a bias, first noticed explicitly by C. A. B.
Smith (1965).
Let a reasonable person be offered a Savage-type option: How much will you pay for a ticket that will return $1.00 if the next toss of this coin lands heads? Now let the same person be offered another Savage-type option: How much will you pay for a ticket that will return $1.00 if the next toss of this coin lands tails? The prices offered by a reasonable person will add up to less than $1.00. He will not have a book made against him − on the contrary, he will be in the bookmaker's position. Of course, as the strict Bayesian will point out, we can demand that he make offers that add up to $1.00. We can force him to do this. We can impose penalties if he doesn't. But then the choice of an offer is hardly a free choice, is it?
The "bias" observed by Smith is that the offers add up to less than one: the degree to which the person believes 'tails' and the degree to which the person believes 'heads' add up to less than one. Shades of Shafer's belief functions! (See Section 3.3.)
But now let us ask if it is appropriate to talk of 'degrees' at all. Degrees, as degrees of temperature, reflect a continuum of values isomorphic to a subset of the real numbers. Who says beliefs are like this? Keynes (1921) explicitly denies it: it is easy (according to Keynes) to imagine two propositions such that neither is more probable than the other, nor are they equally probable: they are simply incomparable; though each is comparable to other propositions. No proposition is more probable than a tautology; none is less probable than a contradiction. We have a partial order, of precisely the sort exploited by Koopman (1940) .
One instance of such an order is constituted by an ordering of intervals, where one interval is 'less' than another if every point in the first is less than any point in the second. If neither of two intervals is less than the other, we simply say that they are incomparable. There -----17 - are two ways in which two intervals may be incomparable: they may overlap, or one may be properly included in the other.
If the range of the probability function is to be intervals in conformity to the intuitions we are now considering, that doesn't at all settle the question of what they represent formally.
We may take their formal representation to be a set of classical point-valued probability functions. This does not prejudge the issue of what rational belief is. One could say either:
A collection of probability intervals itself represents rational belief; rational belief is itself an interval kind of thing, or A collection of probability intervals represents a set of constraints on rational belief; beliefs are real-valued, and rational beliefs satisfy the interval constraints imposed by probability.
One might add to the second view that, in addition, these real-valued rational degrees of belief should satisfy the probability calculus, as Ramsey (1931) argued. It is not clear what is accomplished by this. It is not needed for protection against actual dutch books (since the deductively rational agent will not act so as to guarantee himself a loss) and potential dutch books deductively require that the agent commit himself in advance to taking any series of bets (at his odds) that are offered him.
Without that added condition, there seems to be little motivation for adopting the more complex view embodied in our second alternative. This still allows us to think of the intervals as the envelope of a set of probability functions, even though the individual probability functions in the set have no psychological or epistemological role. We are merely adopting a mathematically convenient representation.
This representation does embody some constraints.
Theorem: Suppose the probability of A is [p, q] . Then there must exist a probability function in our set for which the probability of A is p, and one for which the probability of A is q. Then the probability of A must be [1−q, 1−p], according to these same probability functions.
Proof: Suppose that A and B are logically exclusive, and that the probability of A is [p, q] , and the probability of B is [r, s] . Then the probability of A v B is bounded below by p+r. Let the probability functions be p , p , p , and p ; p cannot assign a probability to B of less than r, We have said nothing about the internal structure of the set of probability functions whose envelope determines the probability intervals. That will be the topic of subsequent sections. Nor have we discussed the question of updating − how new evidence impinges on these sets of probabilities.
There is one more topic that can appropriately be mentioned here, however. According to one view of probability that takes probabilities to be intervals (Kyburg, 1961; 1983b) , the probability interval is determined by statistical knowledge; it is the statistical knowledge that yields the bounds of the interval. The general idea is that the probability of a statement A is [p, q] when A is equivalent to a statement that can be referred to a reference class about which it is known that the measure of the corresponding target class lies between p and q. It is the statistical knowledge that yields the interval, and the known statistical structure, convex or not, that determines the relations among probability intervals.
This may yield a slightly different structure, in view of the role played by the conditions of randomness in the selection of a reference class. It remains true that the probability of A is [1−q, 1−p] when the probability of A is [p, q] , because if R is the right reference class for A, it is also the right reference class for A. But the result for disjunction must be weakened, since it may not be the case that A, T, and A v T will all be referred to a common reference class.
Specifically, if one potential reference class differs from another only in that it provides a narrower interval (for example, we know more about the behavior of coins in general than about this particular coin that I pull from my pocket) then it is to be preferred. In the case of A vT, there is a possible reference class whose interval is bounded as above by [p +r, q +s]; but this reference class may be ruled out by other considerations. It can be shown, however, that any appropriate reference class mentions an interval that includes that interval or is included in it (Kyburg, 1983a ).
Convex Bayesianism
As does intervalism, convex Bayesianism relaxes the strict Bayesian requirement of a single, numerically determinate probability function in any given context. An agent is allowed a set, S, of probability functions; but the set must be convex: for any p and p contained in S,
and for any 0≤λ≤1, S must also contain the function p , where, for any X in the algebra of 3 events in question,
It is sometimes useful to consider the probability p (A | E) of an event A conditional on the truth of another event E (and nothing else), where
The act of replacing p with p′, where for all A in the algebra,
is referred to as conditionalization (Bacchus et al., 1991) . Levi (1980) has shown that the set S′ of all distributions
obtainable from the members p of a convex set S is also convex. (Replacing S with S′ is referred to as convex conditionalization. Computational details, for the special case of a convex polytope, are discussed by Snow (1986 Snow ( , 1991 .)
Thus, with respect to representing and updating probabilities, convex Bayesianism includes strict Bayesianism as the special case in which S is a singleton.
Imprecision vs. Indeterminacy
In each of the examples of the previous section, the available information naturally determines a set of classical probability functions. Levi (1985) distinguishes two attitudes toward such sets. Under the "black box" (Good, 1962) interpretation, the agent is committed to some single (unknown) element of this set "whether he knows it or not". This view is not incompatible with strict Bayesianism. Maximum entropy or other techniques may be applied to remove the residual imprecision in the determination of the required probabilities. In contrast, the "permissibility" construal would regard the probability judgment, relative to such information, irremediably indeterminate, and the agent would be permitted to use any of the probability functions consistent with the data.
Although we prefer the permissibility to the black box interpretation, we would not regard it as reasonable for an agent to select a single probability function from the permissible set, by some method like maximum entropy or otherwise, since this would amount to rejecting probability functions that are not ruled out by the available information. But the agent is not thereby paralyzed. As many authors (including Levi, and going at least as far back as Wald (1950) and Hurwicz (1951) ) have recognized (but for the most part have not discussed in much mathematical detail), a decision theory based on sets of probability functions is possible.
Convex Bayesianism and Decision
The subsets of the probability simplex picked out by the types of data discussed so far are convex sets. Further, they are not arbitrary convex sets, but convex polytopes, bounded sets of solutions to systems of linear inequalities.
-----20 -
Example:
The expected value of a spin of a top with 3 sides labelled '1', '2' and '3' is said to be 2. This is consistent with an infinite set of biases, the solutions to the pair of linear
This set is a line segment in [0, 1] with endpoints (0, 1, 0) and (0.5, 0, 0.5). chosen. (Jeffrey (1976) shows that a problem in which independence fails can be converted to an equivalent problem in which it holds.) Let u denote the utility of choosing act a when i j i c is the case. Then the expected utility of a relative to a classical probability function p on j i {c , . . . , c } is 1 n n u ×p(c ).
The domain (Starr, 1966) of a , D (a ), is the set of all probability functions on
. . , c } relative to which the expected utility of a is maximum (or tied for maximum)
among all the alternatives.
Let S denote the set of probability distributions representing the agent's belief. An action a is E-admissible relative to S iff there exists a p ∈S relative to which it maximizes i expected utility (Levi, 1980) . This is equivalent to the condition
For a convex Bayesian, S is a convex set and is (usually) characterizable as the solution set of a system of linear inequalities with unknowns p (c ), as is D (a ). D (a ) is the set of all
If there exist solutions to the combined system consisting of the inequalities characterizing S to strict Bayesian expected utility maximization when S is a unit set.
Example: For the decision problem given by the matrix As can be determined by linear programming, there are no solutions to the corresponding systems for a and a . Some authors seem to be unaware of the possibility of such an analysis. In a passage discussing the prospects for a personalistic theory of upper and lower probability in a recent review article (Genest et al., 1986; p. 124) , the statement is made: "...it is unclear how the class [of strict Bayesian probability functions enveloped by the upper and lower bounds] could be used 'at the end of the day.' A standard error is given without a point estimate, as it were."
More than one action may be E-admissible. Levi recommends the use of criteria based on security, e.g., maximin, to select a single action from the E-admissible set. An alternative approach would be to attempt to reduce the size of the set S of probability functions. The smaller the set S, the fewer the domains D (a ) with which it has nonempty intersections. The i maximum entropy method may be regarded as an extreme version of this approach. Less objectionable is the method of Loui (1986) , who advocates lowering the value of the parameter determining the width of Kyburgian epistemological probabilities until a value is reached relative to which a single action is admissible. A method in the same spirit, for decision making given only marginal probabilities, is discussed by Pittarelli (1991) .
Belief Functions
It is probably the case that more practitioners are using belief functions (Shafer, 1975) than are using convex sets of classical probability functions in order to overcome what they view as the unreasonable demands of strict Bayesianism.
A belief function on a frame of discernment W of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events is a mapping Bel from the algebra of subsets of W to the interval [0, 1] with the properties:
(1) Bel (∅) = 0.
(2) Bel (W) = 1.
A classical probability function (Bayesian belief function) is a special case in which the inequality in condition (3) is replaced by equality. The appeal of belief functions is that they are not necessarily additive. One may assign belief of x to an event without assigning 1−x to its complement. Complete agnosticism is expressed by the vacuous belief function, for which Bel (X) = 0 for any proper subset X of W. There is no way to do this with a single classical probability function over W. The traditional solution would be to assign the probability In summary: Convex Bayesianism includes strict Bayesianism as a special case. Convex
Bayesianism includes the theory of belief functions as a special case. Conditionalization of a convex set of probability functions yields another convex set of functions. The convex set representation allows for more flexibility and faithfulness to available information than does the strict Bayesian representation. In the usual convex case, the information determines a set of probability functions that can be characterized as the set of solutions to a system of linear inequalities. This makes possible an expected-utility decision methodology based on linear programming.
Problems for convex Bayesianism
There are natural constraints on probability judgments that cannot be represented by convex sets of classical probability functions. These constraints can, however, be captured by nonconvex sets of functions. It will be shown that it is possible to devise decision methods for such sets.
Disjunctive constraints
Suppose that one is informed that a particular six-sided die has been manufactured in 1 such a way that either the outcome '1' is favored at the expense of '2' by or conversely 12 and is otherwise fair. The possible biases (either of which may be adopted as probabilities for the toss outcomes) are which is the union of two disjoint infinite convex sets.
It may be argued that these numbers represent possible frequencies which in turn justify a range of permissible probabilities, with probabilities construed as betting rates. I.e., the frequencies (*) make acceptable any odds in the range 1:11 to 3:9 for a bet on '1'. However, while any number in this range represents reasonable odds for a single bet, we know that in the long run only one extreme or the other will represent a break-even set of odds for a sequence of bets. In the long run any odds other than one of the extremes is doomed to lead to loss.
Note that since the biases (*) are not representable by a convex set of probability functions with sample space equal to the set of six possible die toss outcomes, they are not representable by a single Dempster-Shafer belief function with this set as its frame of discernment. (This follows from results in (Kyburg, 1987) .) The closest it seems possible to come is to assign probability masses must either all go to {1} or all go to {2}.
Independence
Judgments of irrelevance (conditional irrelevance), that is, probabilistic independence (conditional independence), are often made, are natural to make, can be made reliably, and provide computational advantages (Pearl, 1988 ).
An extreme case illustrating the computational benefits is that of n k-valued variables a probability distribution over the joint values of which is required. Under the assumption of complete probabilistic independence of the variables, any of the joint probabilities is computable as the product
Estimating the marginal probabilities requires only kn −n numbers, vs. k −1 for the joint probabilities. Even if it is the joint probabilities that are determined initially, the data may be stored and transmitted subsequently in the form of the spectacularly more compact marginal probabilities (Lewis, 1959) .
Unfortunately, the constraint of independence, combined with information that itself would determine a convex set of probability functions, will result in a nonconvex set.
The simplest imaginable example is given by Richard Jeffrey (1987) , who points out that the set of probability functions expressing the irrelevance to each other of a given pair of propositions, and nothing more, is not convex.
Conditional probabilistic independence (of which probabilistic independence is a special case) is also incompatible with a convex set representation. This is unfortunate, since it is the basis for influence diagram (Shachter, 1988) and Bayesian network (Pearl, 1988) techniques, which make computationally feasible the application of classical probability to the representation and management of uncertainty in domains of realistic size. 
Betting on Independent Events
Suppose that an agent knows that a coin is biased toward tails, but that he thinks that it and its tossing mechanism yield a set of outcomes with a binomial distribution. In particular, suppose that he thinks that the probability of heads on a single toss is in the interval [0.1, 0.5].
It is a deductive consequence of these assumptions that the agent's beliefs regarding the four possible outcomes of a pair of tosses are bounded by the pairs of numbers listed below: 
Observe that this set of betting odds on the outcome of a pair of tosses is perfectly coherent; this is what we expect: the mixture of a pair of coherent betting functions is coherent.
But now, in accordance with the wiley-antagonist model of the Dutch Book Theorem (Ramsey, 1931; deFinetti, 1974) , let the agent post odds in accordance with this coherent distribution of beliefs. The wiley antagonist (a) sells our agent a ticket for $13.00 that returns $100.00 if HH, and nothing otherwise. That's fair. Likewise, it is fair for our antagonist (b) to buy from our agent for $25.50 a ticket that returns $150.00 if HT and nothing otherwise. Any collection of such bets on pairs of tosses would be considered fair.
Let us say that an agent is booked in expectation if, whatever the true state of the world consistent with his beliefs, his long run expectation is negative. The expectation of this set of bets is negative almost everywhere on the interval [0.1, 0.5]. In the long run, relative to his own beliefs, our agent is almost sure to lose.
This may be seen as follows: We compute the expectation of the pair of bets (a) Although the distribution q is a convex combination of distributions satisfying the upper and lower probability constraints and the independence constraint, it fails to satisfy the latter.
Had the agent posted odds in accordance with a distribution q′ exhibiting independence, the antagonist's long-run expectation (and his own), relative to q′, would have been zero. 
i.e., if q′ embodies the independence constraint.
Convex pooling
The traditional solution to the problem of pooling a set of classical probability functions is to replace them with a member of their convex hull, the set of all possible convex combinations of them. A probability function p is a convex combination of functions p , . . . , p iff 1 n n there exist λ ≥0, λ = 1 such that
One may choose to work instead with the entire convex hull of the set of probability functions under consideration. This is the approach of Levi (1974 Levi ( , 1980 , who regards any of the elements of the convex hull to be a permissible resolution of the conflict among the functions and hence permissible for use in decision making, using the criterion of E-admissibility.
But it can affect the outcome of a decision problem if, instead of a nonconvex set A, its convex hull, conv (A), is regarded as the set of permissible functions. If an action is Eadmissible relative to a set A of probability functions, then it is E-admissible relative to its convex hull (since A ⊆conv (A)), but not conversely.
Consider the set of probability functions A = {p , p }, where Relative to set A, only actions a and a are (E-)admissible; a is not:
eu (a , p ) = 2.9375 < 3.125 = eu (a , p ). Because the set of all probability functions relative to which an action maximizes utility is convex, if there is consensus on an admissible action on the part of members of a group who agree on utilities but disagree on probabilities, then that same action is admissible for any function within the convex hull of their individual probability functions. When there is not consensus, it is not obvious that a sufficient condition for admissibility of a group action is that it maximize expected utility relative to some convex combination of the group probabilities. But if any such function is permissible, then any action maximizing expected utility relative to one of these functions should be admissible.
This consequence of the permissibility of all convex combinations of permissible probability functions clashes, for example, with the intuition of Savage (1972) that group minimax is a reasonable group decision criterion. The group minimax rule prescribes selection of an action "such that the largest loss faced by any member of the group will be as small as possible," where the loss associated with an action by a member of the group is the difference between its expectation for that member and the expectation of the action with maximum expectation for that member.
There exist decision problems for which the action maximizing expectation for a convex combination of group probabilities is not a group minimax solution, although the action maximizing expectation for a probability distribution outside the convex hull of the group probabilities is a group minimax solution.
Consider a group containing three members facing a decision among three actions who recognize three relevant states of nature and agree on the utility matrix above. Suppose that the group does not wish to consider mixed actions and that the group opinions are: Suppose that the (classical) probability assessments of n experts are to be combined to form a single probability function. Examples can be constructed to demonstrate that if each expert assesses his probabilities in a manner consistent with the belief in the probabilistic independence of some of the events in the algebra under consideration, a convex combination of the n functions will not necessarily exhibit the independence relations agreed on by the experts. If these relations are merely numerical artifacts, then the failure to preserve them is not a failure of the pooling method. On the other hand, there will be situations in which the experts each do intend for certain independence relations to hold (and may actually use them as a guide in the construction of their full probability function over the algebra of events).
Convex pooling of probability functions exhibits what may be called the marginalization effect. With a fixed set of pooling weights, the result of pooling a set of probability functions and then marginalizing is the same as the result of first marginalizing the functions individually and then pooling. While some regard this as a point in favor of convex pooling schemes (McConway, 1981) , we do not.
Example: Radio station WXYZ has for many years used the weather predictions of a meteorologist who is about to retire but who has recommended two younger colleagues, Mr.
P and Mr. Q, as possible replacements. The station manager calls them and asks them to assess the probabilities of the following events: it will rain tomorrow and the sun will rise the day after, it will rain and the sun will not rise, it will not rain tomorrow and the sun will rise the day after, and it will not rain and the sun will not rise. She includes the sunrise question as a test; if either meteorologist gives positive probability to the sun not rising then she will not take seriously the probability given to rain by him. (The "dummy events" need only be events about which these alleged experts should have opinions close to some known standard.) Suppose the assessments she receives are: Given p and q and a convex pooling scheme, the choice of weights should be 1 and
RS RS
0. But it would make sense for them to be something like 1/2 and 1/2 given only p and q .
R R
However, even for weights of 1 and 0, the marginal distribution that the station manager takes as representing the weighted pooled opinions of the two, p , remains disturbingly close to q R R on any reasonable measure of the closeness of probability distributions.
More information is available to the pooler in the original probability functions than is available in the marginals (Lindley, 1985) , since the marginals are deducible from the original functions, but usually not conversely. Whether as in the example the information bears on the reliability of the experts or not, there are bound to be situations in which the extra information is wasted if one adopts a pooling method exhibiting the marginalization effect.
Finally, consider a disreputable traveling circus one of whose practices is to have a clown sell bags of peanuts some of which, it is announced to the crowd, contain coupons redeemable for a colorful helium-inflated balloon. Suppose that 50 detectives with binoculars and two-way radios are in attendance at one of the performances. Every ten seconds, in a prearranged sequence, a different detective is to radio his code name and his current pointvalued estimate of the probability that the next bag selected will contain a coupon to a van parked outside the circus tent. The sequence of estimates received up to the time that the reports mysteriously stop is:
2 6 11 11 1 1 , , ,
3 7 12 17 2 3
The sounds of peanut sales continue to be received in the van for several minutes after the 1 final report is received. It would be more reasonable to choose an estimate in the range (0, ) as would result from a convex pooling scheme.
It may be objected that the van occupant and the radio station manager in the two previous examples may be treated as experts themselves. To adopt their probability assessment (whatever it turns out to be) may not be to adopt a probability assessment in the convex hull of the expert assessments canvassed by them; but it is to adopt an element of (extreme point of) the convex hull of the set consisting of their own assessment plus the solicited assessments. Besides being dictatorial, this strikes us as not the type of aggregation of expert opinion that the proponents of convex pooling have in mind. Expert opinions are typically solicited by decision makers who are not themselves experts in the domains of the decision problems they face. In these two examples, the station manager is not a weather forecaster and it may be that the van occupant has poor vision.
Set-based Bayesianism
The representational inadequacies of the convex set characterization of uncertainty may be overcome by the use of sets of classical probability functions that are not necessarily convex, but at some computational cost for decision making. Before examining the technical problems for a more general set-based Bayesian decision theory, we first examine some related methods. Gardenfors and Sahlin (1982) propose two stages in the identification of a subset of the probability simplex. First, the set of functions that do not "contradict the decision maker's knowledge in the given decision situation" are identified as "epistemically possible". A realvalued measure of the "epistemic reliability" of the functions in the epistemically possible set is introduced that is in the spirit of Keynes' weight of evidence. Only those probability functions with epistemic reliability values above some threshold are retained for use in decision making.
Previous work
Example: In the case of a 2x2 contingency table with known marginals
the epistemically possible set of joint probability functions is
Suppose that the identities of attributes A and B are kept secret. The agent may have extensive experience with attributes in general, and may believe that attributes tend to be independent.
It is reasonable then for him to choose a reliability measure that gives maximum reliability to and is symmetric around the probability function computed under the assumption of probabilistic independence of A and B. The epistemically reliable set is then a subset of E for which xy −ε ≤ p (AB) ≤ xy +ε.
A related representation of beliefs is proposed by Nau (1989) . In place of an unrestricted "epistemic reliability" measure, he utilizes a concave, piecewise-linear function on the unit interval to characterize the "confidence weight" associated with any possible probability value for an event. The collection of these functions for each of the events under consideration determines a convex subset of the probability simplex over the events.
Gardenfors and Sahlin endorse selecting the action whose minimum expected utility for any p in the epistemically reliable set is maximum. This criterion may result in selection of actions that are not E-admissible.
Example: Let S = {p | p (c ) ≥1/2} for the decision problem Suppose that each p ∈S is sufficiently reliable. Action a has the maximum minimum 3 expected utility as p ranges over S, but there is no single p ∈S relative to which a has the 3 maximum expected utility of the three.
The epistemically reliable sets in these examples happen to be convex. Gardenfors and Sahlin give an example in which the epistemically reliable set is not convex. However, they do not address the computational problems that may arise in attempting to determine the admissibility of actions relative to such sets.
Determining E-admissibility
Although we have advocated the use of linear programming algorithms to determine Eadmissibility of actions relative to linearly constrained sets of classical probability functions (which are adequate to characterize all of the convex constraints discussed so far), all that it is necessary to determine is whether or not there exist any feasible solutions to the linear programming problem. It is not necessary to identify an optimal solution. (The objective function can be just p (c ), where c is one of the states for the decision problem.) Thus, for nonj j linear or non-convex constraints, the fact that a particular optimization method is unable to guarantee that the local optimum it identifies will be a global optimum does not mean that Eadmissibility cannot be determined.
As an example of a nonlinear but convex constraint on probabilities, consider a probabilk, ity function p :{X, X}→ [0, 1] , where p (X)=x k >2, and x is taken to lie in the interval [l, u] .
X may be the event 'k successes in k trials' for some binomial experiment. An action a is Ei admissible relative to such information if and only if there exists an x ∈[l, u ] for which
Example: T has just met B, who claims that she lives with her teenage daughter. The domains of the actions are Suppose that a decision is to be made with an outcome contingent on the result of the Action a has expected utility at least as great as action a when So a is not E-admissible.
1 >From above, a has expected utility at least as great as a for every value of the parameter x. Similarly, a is E-admissible. 
Decomposition
A set S of classical probability functions for a decision problem may be not only nonconvex but nonconnected, i.e., the union of two or more separated sets (Lay, 1982) . Disjunctive constraints on probabilities, as discussed in Section 4.1, are characterized by such sets. These sets are not representable by a single system of simultaneous inequalities. However, if an action is E-admissible relative to one of the connected sets into which S is decomposable, then it is E-admissible relative to S (and conversely). Recall that a decision problem partitions the probability simplex into convex domains, one for each action. An action is Eadmissible if and only if the intersection of S and its domain is nonempty. For . . . S = S ∪ ∪S , S ∩D≠∅ if and only if, for some i, S ∩D≠∅.)
For a finite set S of probability functions, an action is tested against each element individually, in some arbitrary order, until a probability function relative to which the action maximizes expected utility is found or the set is exhausted. In the worst case, the computation required to identify the admissible actions is increased by a factor of |S| over a strict Bayesian analysis (not counting the effort involved in settling on a unique probability function). For a finite union of connected sets some of which may be infinite, the actions are tested for Eadmissibility relative to each set.
A decision problem involving the probabilities of the biased die discussed in Section 4.1 would be analyzed in this way. An action would be E-admissible iff it were E-admissible relative either to Some sets of classical probability functions are neither connected nor finite unions of connected sets of probability functions, e.g., Any decision relative to the nonconvex set S thus may be decomposed into two decision problems involving convex sets. (For the criterion of Gardenfors and Sahlin, the overall minimum expected utility for each action may be computed as the minimum of the minima relative to each of the convex sets. An action whose aggregate minimum is maximum is selected. This action is not always E-admissible.)
Conclusion
Strict Bayesianism is too strict. It is unreasonable to demand that an agent adopt a single real-valued probability function in any and all decision-making contexts. Probabilities should be based on statistical knowledge, i.e., knowledge of frequencies; the data usually warrant only a more-or-less narrow interval of probability for each event under consideration. Even if one somehow has real-valued probabilities for certain events, they may not be those directly relevant for a particular decision problem. For example, one may have strict Bayesian marginal or conditional probabilities, from which one may infer a convex set of strict Bayesian probability functions, from which in turn bounds on the probabilities of interest may be inferred.
Convex Bayesianism, on the other hand, is not strict enough. By allowing any convex combination of strict Bayesian probability functions compatible with the available information into the set of permissible functions, incompatible probability functions may be introduced. This is most serious in the case of (conditional) probabilistic independence. Independence assumptions are necessary in domains of realistic size for efficient management of uncertainty. Furthermore, such assumptions may often reliably be based on fundamental knowledge about causality. Unfortunately, independence introduces nonconvexity.
Replacing a not-necessarily convex set of classical probability functions with its convex hull may result in unnecessary indecisiveness; an action may be E-admissible with respect to the convex hull of a set S but not relative to S itself.
It may also lead to financial ruin. As discussed in Section 4.3, posting odds in accordance with a probability function not in S but in the convex hull of S may result in negative long-run expectation relative to the knowledge embodied in S.
A set-based Bayesian will represent uncertainty by a set of classical probability functions, as will the convex Bayesian. However, given the same data, hers will be a subset of the convex Bayesian's representation. (Hence, her representation will be more informative, in a Dalkey-Jeffrey sense.)
Determination of whether or not an action is E-admissible relative to a convex or nonconvex set S for which a system of constraints can be formulated (we have discussed examples only of linear constraints, for the convex case) requires determination of the existence of a feasible solution to a mathematical programming problem; it is not necessary to identify an optimal solution. Thus, it is not clear that the computational costs associated with a more flexible set-based Bayesianism are so much greater that one should have to settle for a strictly convex alternative to strict Bayesianism.
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